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ABO blood group 
Modelling 
A B S T R A C T   
Several independent datasets suggest blood type A is over-represented and type O under-represented among 
COVID-19 patients. However, blood group antigens appear not to be conventional susceptibility factors in that 
they do not affect disease severity, and the relative risk to non-O individuals is attenuated when population 
prevalence is high. Here, I model a scenario in which ABO transfusion incompatibility reduces the chance of a 
patient transmitting the virus to an incompatible recipient – thus in Western populations type A and AB in-
dividuals are “super-recipients” while type O individuals are “super-spreaders”. This results in an offset in the 
timing of the epidemic among individuals of different blood types, and an increased relative risk to type A/AB 
patients that is most pronounced during early stages of the epidemic. However, once the majority of any given 
population is infected, the relative risk to each blood type approaches unity. Published data on COVID-19 
prevalence from regions in the early stages of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic suggests that if this model holds true, 
ABO incompatibility reduces virus transmissibility by at least 60 %. Exploring the implications of this model for 
vaccination strategies shows that paradoxically, targeted vaccination of either high-susceptibility type A/AB or 
“super-spreader” type O individuals is less effective than random vaccination at blocking community spread of 
the virus. Instead, the key is to maintain blood type diversity among the remaining susceptible individuals. Given 
the good agreement between this model and observational data on disease prevalence, the underlying 
biochemistry urgently requires experimental investigation.   
1. Introduction 
Multiple recent published studies and preprints have suggested that 
the prevalence of COVID-19 disease varies by blood type, with type A 
being relatively susceptible and type O being less susceptible. Initial 
reports from China were followed by confirmation in the US and Europe 
(Zhao et al., 2020; Zietz and Tatonetti, 2020; Kolin et al., 2021; 
Ellinghaus et al., 2020; Gérard et al., 2020), and have now been sub-
stantiated across the globe (reviewed in (le Pendu et al., 2021)). 
Although some studies report an association with disease severity, this is 
not consistently observed, with the case fatality ratio (CFR) and the 
probability of progressing to intensive care appearing independent of 
blood type in other studies (e.g. (Dzik et al., 2020)). Consistent with this, 
the most recent data (release r5) from the Covid-19 Host Genetics 
Initiative (The COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative, 2020) indicates that 
the ABO gene is the most significant region genome-wide for 
SARS-CoV-2 infection rate, yet has no detectable association with dis-
ease severity when comparing hospitalized and non-hospitalized 
COVID-19 patients. Similarly, an association with disease incidence, 
but not severity, is seen in data from home genetics tests carried out by 
23andMe and AncestryDNA (Anon., 2021a; Roberts et al., 2021). 
However, despite the strong worldwide association between ABO blood 
group and infection risk, a recent study of 1769 crewmembers from the 
French Navy nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle conclusively 
demonstrates that in this scenario, with an overall attack rate of 75.8 %, 
there was no correlation between blood type and incidence of infection 
(Boudin et al., 2020). These conflicting observations require 
explanation. 
Here, I investigate the behaviour of “ABO-interference”: a model of 
epidemic spread in which the transmission of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2, the causal agent of COVID-19) is 
dependent on the ABO blood type compatibility between an infected 
individual and the susceptible people they encounter. Mechanistically, 
this models a scenario in which infectious virions acquire the glycosyl-
ation pattern and hence the ABO antigen status of their current host. 
This in turn allows shed virions to be “rejected” by incompatible re-
cipients, blocking the initial infective step. This immediately explains 
the lack of correlation with disease severity, since once an infection is 
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established, virions produced within the new host are necessarily self- 
compatible and able to spread freely between cells. 
The plausibility of this hypothesis has already been established by 
work on HIV (Neil et al., 2005; Arendrup et al., 1991), and was also 
previously proposed for the 2003 epidemic of SARS (Cheng et al., 2005; 
Guillon et al., 2008), for measles (Preece et al., 2002), and indeed for 
enveloped viruses in general (Seymour et al., 2004; Cooling, 2015). 
Modelling of the proposed evolutionary interaction between virus 
transmission and host ABO antigens provides a convincing explanation 
for the worldwide distribution of A, B and O alleles at this locus (Sey-
mour et al., 2004) (see also Discussion). SARS-CoV-2 has an outer lipid 
membrane containing spike, membrane and envelope (S, M and E) 
proteins, all of which are exposed to immune recognition and any or all 
of which may be glycosylated. Structural studies show that S is heavily 
glycosylated, including fucosylated glycans that may potentially bear 
ABO determinants (Cooling, 2015; Watanabe et al., 2020), and in vitro 
studies show that spike protein does indeed acquire ABO determinants 
when produced in cells expressing the relevant glycosyltransferases 
(Deleers et al., 2020). The glycosylation status of the M and E proteins 
has not yet been characterised, nor the glycosylation status of the 
membrane lipids. Cell-cell adhesion experiments using engineered CHO 
cells expressing S and an ACE2-expressing cell line show that anti-A 
antibodies can block spike-mediated adhesion, but only when the 
S-expressing cells also express the A glycosyltransferase (Guillon et al., 
2008). This study also showed via modelling that ABO-interference can 
reduce the progress of an epidemic dependent on the magnitude of the 
block to transmission and the local population structure. However, 
despite the mechanistic plausibility of this hypothesis and the pre-
liminary data from the SARS epidemic, there has as yet been no detailed 
modelling exploring the implications of ABO-interference for the rela-
tive susceptibility of individuals with different blood types at different 
stages of the epidemic, or for vaccination strategies. 
In this analysis, I develop an extended SIR (Susceptible, Infected, 
Recovered) epidemiological model which allows for a partial or total 
block to virus transmission from an infected patient to an incompatible 
recipient, and explore the implications of this model for epidemic pro-
gression and for vaccination strategies. Strikingly, I find that this model 
is able to reconcile all the observations to date. ABO-interference does 
indeed lead to significant differences in disease incidence between 
different blood types, but only when the overall population prevalence is 
low. 
2. Results 
2.1. Modelling ABO-interference with virus transmission 
The simplest of all epidemic models assumes a homogeneously 
mixing population divided into susceptible, infectious and recovered 
groups or “compartments”. This yields three variables S, I and R, which 
respectively represent the proportion of the population with each status. 
Such a model is completely described by two parameters β and ν, rep-
resenting the rate constants for infection and recovery respectively. The 
duration of the infectious period d is given by 1 / ν. All simulations 
presented here are based on d = 7 days, and none of the results presented 
are sensitive to this parameter. R0 is given by the product β.d (or 
equivalently βν) and represents the basic reproduction number, i.e. the 
mean number of individuals infected by a typical infectious individual 
during their illness, in the context of a completely susceptible population 
(Jones, 2007). 
To this model I add a further parameter ρ where 0 ≤ ρ < 100 %, 
representing the relative probability of cross-type infection (Fig. 1, see 
Methods for full details). In this extended model, R0 is not a well-defined 
quantity since even in a fully susceptible population the current effective 
R value, denoted R(t), depends on ρ and on the blood type distributions 
in both S and I. Below, I use Rmax to indicate the maximal possible value 
of R(t). This will be observed when the population is fully susceptible 
and transmission is unimpeded, i.e. when ρ  = 100 % or all currently 
infected individuals are type O. 
2.2. A quasi steady state is obtained when all blood types are infected 
If ρ = 0 and the index case is non-O, then it is impossible for the 
epidemic to enter the O sub-population. Since this is not the case in the 
real world, this scenario is not explored further here. Fig. 2 illustrates the 
progress of simulated epidemics occurring under varying values of ρ and 
different population blood group distributions. In row 2A, I analyse an 
epidemic with Rmax = 4 and ρ = 20 %, occurring within a typical 
Western population with a high frequency of each of types O and A, and 
lower frequencies of types B and AB. Since ρ = 20 % represents a sub-
stantial block to transmission, the transmission rate R(t) during initial 
stages of the epidemic is depressed by around 1/3 compared to an un-
mitigated epidemic. In the early stages of the epidemic, the relative risk 
is highest for types A and AB, and since AB is rare at the population level, 
the majority of infections are type A individuals. Conversely, type O is 
relatively protected during early stages of the epidemic. By the later 
stages of the epidemic the pool of susceptible A, B and AB individuals 
has become depleted and thus type O cases predominate. In terms of 
cumulative cases, type AB (as the universal recipient) is at highest 
relative risk, and type O (as the most restrictive recipient) at lowest 
relative risk, however the magnitude of the difference is starkly different 
depending on whether the epidemic is in the late or early phase. 
In row 2B, I analyse an epidemic with Rmax = 4 and ρ = 80 %, 
occurring within the same Western population. The same general 
pattern is observed, however the level of suppression of R(t) is less 
pronounced, and the overall difference in risk between the blood groups 
is greatly attenuated, due to the higher level of cross-type transmission. 
Rows 2C and 2D illustrate epidemics with Rmax = 4 and ρ = 20 %, 
occurring within populations with blood type distributions typical of 
India or Peru, respectively. In the “Indian” model epidemic, the degree 
of R(t) suppression is similar to that seen in a Western population, but 
type B individuals are at higher risk than type A. In the “Peruvian” model 
epidemic, the high frequency of type O (universal transmitter) in the 
population means that R(t) is barely suppressed even though cross-type 
transmission is greatly restricted. 
Importantly, whenever infection is present among individuals with 
all four blood types (i.e. there is at least one type O index case, or ρ > 0), 
the blood type distribution among infected people rapidly converges 
upon a new equilibrium that is significantly skewed relative to the initial 
population distribution. This equilibration process causes R(t) to also 
settle on an equilibrium value during the early stages of the epidemic, 
hereafter called Rsteady. This is a rapid process, with R(t) reaching Rsteady 
within a few serial intervals: in these simulations this equates to ~0.1 % 
of the population being infected. Therefore, in real-world epidemics 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the transmission model. Full arrows represent unimpeded 
transmission (infection rate = β) and dashed arrows represent impeded trans-
mission (infection rate = ρ ⋅ β). 
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subject to ABO-interference, estimates of R0 based on population sta-
tistics are likely to actually measure Rsteady and thus underestimate the 
true value of Rmax. 
2.3. Estimating ρ for SARS-CoV-2 
During the early steady state described above, Rsteady is a consistent 
multiple of Rmax, indicating that ABO-interference suppresses the 
Fig. 2. These panels show the evolution of various modelled parameters for epidemics initialised under different conditions. For all epidemics Rmax = 4 and the 
model is initialized with type O index cases comprising 1/1,000,000 of the population. Since type O transmits freely to all recipients, R(t) = Rmax at time t = 0. 
A: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, “Western” population blood type distribution, 38 % A / 14 % B / 4 % AB / 44 % O. 
B: Rmax = 4, ρ = 80 %, “Western” population blood type distribution as above. 
C: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, “Indian” population blood type distribution, 21.4 % A / 39.9 % B / 9.4 % AB / 29.3 % O (Cooling, 2015). 
D: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, “Peruvian” population blood type distribution, 18.9 % A / 8.1 % B / 1.6 % AB / 71.4 % O (Watanabe et al., 2020). 
For all sub-panels, X axis denotes days. Y axes: (first column) proportion of the population infected; (second column) R(t) as a fraction of Rmax; (third column) 
distribution of blood types among currently infected individuals; (fourth column) cumulative risk of infection for each blood type relative to type O. 
P.J.I. Ellis                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Epidemics 35 (2021) 100446
4
epidemic with equal efficiency regardless of both the underlying infec-
tiousness of the pathogen and any effect of non-pharmaceutical in-
terventions on R(t). Similarly, the relative risk to each blood type is also 
dependent only on ρ and the background population blood type distri-
bution, and independent of Rmax (Supplementary Fig. 1). Thus, regard-
less of whether the epidemic in any given region is progressing quickly 
or slowly, the relative risk to each blood type is predictable from the 
population blood type frequencies and the value of ρ. Conversely, so 
long as total seroprevalence is low and the epidemic lies within the 
steady-state region of the curve, measurement of the relative risk for 
different blood types allows estimation of ρ. 
Table 1 shows data compiled from a range of published studies that 
have reported ABO frequencies amongst infected SARS-CoV-2 patients 
and controls (Zhao et al., 2020; Zietz and Tatonetti, 2020; Ellinghaus 
et al., 2020) during the early stages of the first wave of the worldwide 
pandemic. These collectively cover epidemics in two regions of China, 
three regions of Spain, and one region each of Italy and the United 
States. For each data set, I used the control blood type distribution to 
predict the expected steady state distribution among infected patients 
for different values of ρ, and thus the expected case frequencies for each 
study, dependent upon sample size. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was 
then used to compare the observed case frequencies to the model-based 
expectations. A low p value indicates that the observed case frequencies 
are incompatible with the model prediction, and thus the corresponding 
value of ρ is unlikely. Conversely, a higher p value indicates that the 
corresponding value of ρ is compatible with the observed data. Notably, 
for all data sets the chi-square peak p value lies between ρ = 20 % and 
ρ = 55 % despite the different underlying blood type frequencies and 
relative risk ratios in each country, indicating that in all regions of the 
world, the most plausible estimate of ρ lies in this range. For the Italian 
and Spanish study, data was also provided for area-matched control data 
from blood donors (Ellinghaus et al., 2020): using these instead of the 
internal control data does not affect the result. 
Several caveats apply to this analysis. Firstly, poor demographic 
matching between cases and controls may distort the results. This is 
apparent in the Spanish sample from (Ellinghaus et al., 2020), where the 
distribution of cases and controls was uneven between contributing 
hospitals. Thus, for the aggregate sample, all values of ρ have a low 
chi-square p value indicating a poor fit between model and data. In this 
case, using locally matched blood donor samples results in a better fit 
without altering the overall findings (Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2). 
Secondly, the “steady state” only holds during the early stages of the 
epidemic, and the relative risk approaches unity once the majority of the 
population is infected as in the case of the Charles de Gaulle study 
(Boudin et al., 2020)). Even in the countries analysed here, in which 
overall prevalence was low at the time of study, the local prevalence in 
“hotspots” is much higher (Percivalle et al., 2020). Infected individuals 
will by definition originate preferentially from hotspot regions. In such 
areas, the epidemic may have progressed beyond the steady state region 
of the epidemic curve, reducing the degree of blood type skewing among 
the infected population and partially masking the effects of 
ABO-interference on virus transmission. In this case, in order to generate 
the observed changes in blood type frequency, then the degree of 
ABO-interference must be even more pronounced. i.e. the estimate of 
~40 % is a maximum bound, and the true frequency of cross-type 
transmission may be even lower. 
Thirdly, the SIR model assumes that population mixing and oppor-
tunities for transmission are independent of blood type. This is unlikely 
to be the case since blood relatives living together are both more likely 
to infect each other and more likely to share a blood type. This effect will 
also tend to mask the effect of ABO-interference. This effect will be most 
pronounced in areas with relatively segregated ethnic communities, as 
for example in the New York sample where black and white Americans 
have differing blood type distributions and social mixing is also likely to 
be uneven. 
Fourthly, when there is nosocomial spread within a hospital, an in-
crease in frequency of one blood type among infected patients will lead 
to a decrease in frequency of that blood type in the remaining uninfected 
Table 1 
Observed case and control numbers are taken from references Zhao et al. (2020), Zietz and Tatonetti (2020), Ellinghaus et al. (2020). The Italian and Spanish data sets 
provided both internal and external controls. For each area, the control blood group frequencies were used to calculate expected case numbers for each blood group in 
each study, for varying values of ρ. Calculating the chi-square goodness of fit between the predicted case numbers and observed numbers allows region-specific 
estimation of ρ. The orange highlight indicates the most plausible value of ρ for each study, while the yellow highlight indicates all values with p > 0.05 after Bon-
ferroni multiple testing correction.  
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hospital patients. This will exaggerate the effects of ABO-interference if 
uninfected hospitalised patients are used as controls. 
Since the majority of these effects will tend to oppose the effects of 
ABO-interference and thus bias the estimate of ρ upwards, the central 
estimate of ~40 % represents a best-guess upper bound for ρ. Intrigu-
ingly, previous data from direct contact tracing (Guillon et al., 2008) 
imply ρ = 47.7 % for the 2003 hospital outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong, 
suggesting that values around this range may be a feature of coronavirus 
infections in general. 
2.4. Is targeting by blood type a useful vaccination strategy? 
Initial preprints noting the increased risk to type A individuals have 
proposed that these may require additional surveillance and priority for 
protection. However, ABO-interference with virus transmission presents 
a unique and striking scenario that has not previously been modelled in 




, i.e. the degree of suppression of R0 during the early “steady state” portion of an epidemic with ρ = 30 %, according to the 
population ABO allele frequencies. B allele frequency = (100 % - O% - A%). B: Heat map showing the degree of suppression of R0 during the early stages of the 
epidemic, according to the background population blood type frequencies. In both heat maps, ABO allele frequencies are assumed to be in Hardy-Weinberg equi-
librium – i.e. allele frequencies are not changing from generation to generation, there is no net selection or gene flow, and that mating is random with respect to 
genotype. The colour gradient from red to green indicates the degree of suppression in 5 % increments, with the blue highlight indicating maximal suppression of 
virus transmission. The boxed areas of the plots indicate allele / blood type frequencies that are typically observed in human populations (For interpretation of the 
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article). 
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detail, in which those most prone to infection are those least likely to 
pass it on, and vice versa. This raises the question as to whether it is 
more important to vaccinate the most susceptible individuals, or the 
most infectious individuals. Fig. 3A shows (1 − RsteadyRmax ), i.e. the degree to 
which R0 is suppressed by ABO-interference, across the full spectrum of 
potential ABO allele frequencies for ρ = 30 %. ABO-interference sup-
presses transmission most efficiently when the allele frequency ratio is 
approximately 40 % O / 30 % A / 30 % B alleles. Translating allele 
frequencies to blood type frequencies yields Fig. 3B. Thus, ABO- 
interference suppresses transmission most efficiently when type O in-
dividuals make up 15 % of the population and type A / type B in-
dividuals are present in equal proportions. This is however not the case 
for any existing human populations, since O is the most common blood 
type worldwide (see Discussion). A similar shape heat map is obtained 
for values of ρ = 20 % and ρ = 90 % (not shown). Amongst actual pop-
ulations worldwide, the effect of ABO-interference in lowering R(t) is 
likely to be most pronounced within East and Southeast Asian countries, 
where type O is only moderate frequency, and A and B are more evenly 
balanced. 
From the standpoint of vaccination strategy, vaccinating type O in-
dividuals effectively moves the population upwards in Fig. 3B, while 
vaccinating type A or B moves the population right or left respectively. 
In principle, an optimal vaccination strategy will cause the distribution 
among susceptible individuals to move “down” the gradient towards 
more effective suppression of the epidemic. Conversely, the vaccination 
strategy must also be careful not to disrupt the intrinsic protection 
afforded by ABO-interference. To illustrate this, consider a population 
with 50 % type A and 50 % type O individuals, similar to Māori and 
some Polynesian populations where the type B frequency is very low 






, so in the absence of ABO-interference the threshold for an 
epidemic with an Rmax of 3 is 66.7 %. In such a population, if ρ = 30 % 
then Rsteady = 2.32, ald the risk for type A individuals is 1.82 times 
higher than type O individuals, and type O individuals are 1.54 times as 
infectious as type A individuals. 
A well-intentioned strategy to reduce infection might prioritise 
vaccinating type O “super-spreaders” before type A. However, once all 
type O individuals have been immunised, the protective effect of ABO- 
interference is abolished since the remaining susceptible population is 
now exclusively type A, and an infected type A individual can freely 
transmit to any remaining susceptible individual. Herd immunity will 
therefore only be attained when the full 66.7 % of the population is 
vaccinated. The same applies in reverse if the more vulnerable type A 
individuals are instead prioritised for vaccination. However, vaccinating 
both blood types equally produces herd immunity when 56.9 % of the 
population is vaccinated, consistent with Rsteady in this population. This 
effect is further magnified if transmission is brought down by other 
means, for example non-pharmaceutical interventions including social 
distancing. For the same population and same value of ρ = 30 %, if 
Rmax = 2 then Rsteady = 1.55. In this case the herd immunity threshold is 
50 % of the population if preferentially vaccinating either type O or type 
A, but only 35.4 % if vaccinating individuals at random [Fig. 4]. 
2.5. The effect of waning immunity for a virus subject to ABO-interference 
At present it is unknown whether SARS-CoV-2 leads to long-lasting 
immunity. The four other endemic human coronaviruses do not confer 
lasting immunity, and repeat infection is common. In an SIR model, 
when immunity is allowed to wane over time, then population spread of 
the virus can resume once the population level of immunity falls below 
the herd immunity threshold. Over time this leads to damped oscillatory 
behaviour, with recurrent pulses of infection converging on a final 
steady state. In this final steady state, by definition R(t) = 1 and there is 
steady sustained transmission with overall infection levels neither 
growing nor shrinking [Fig. 5]. The final population disease burden 
depends on the duration of immunity, with a shorter immune duration 
leading to a higher population-wide average prevalence. In the endemic 
state, with waning immunity and recurrent infection, the relative risk to 
each blood type should be interpreted as a difference in the frequency of 
infection: e.g. if type A has a relative risk of 1.1 compared to type O, it 
means type A individuals are 10 % more likely to suffer an infection 
within any given time period. 
Intriguingly, while the relative risk to different blood groups during 
disease emergence is independent of Rmax (see Supplementary Fig. 1), 
the final steady state for an endemic disease with waning immunity is 
independent of ω but does depend on Rmax (compare 5A, B, C). When 
Rmax is high, the relative risk at equilibrium for all blood types is close to 
unity. When Rmax is low, then the relative risk at equilibrium for all 
blood types is similar to that seen during disease emergence. Intuitively, 
this follows from the fact that for a highly contagious disease with a high 
Rmax, everyone will become infected as soon as their immunity wears 
off, irrespective of blood type. For a less contagious disease with a low 
Rmax, then there is more scope for differential susceptibility to play a 
part in how frequently individuals become infected. 
3. Discussion 
3.1. The biological interpretation of the parameter ρ 
In this model, ρ represents the relative probability of virus trans-
mission between an infected individual and an ABO-incompatible target 
individual. Mechanistically, this will encompass at least three sources of 
variability: (a) the extent to which the infected individual deposits ABO 
antigen on the surface of the virions produced, (b) the extent to which 
the target individual carries anti-A or anti-B antibodies, and (c) the 
ability of these antibodies to access the incoming virions and prevent 
infection. 
Of these, (a) will depend not only on the host’s ABO genotype, but 
also on their Secretor (Se) status (Watkins, 1980). “Non-secretor” in-
dividuals are homozygous for null mutations in the FUT2 gene. In these 
Fig. 4. X axis: days. Y axis: proportion of the 
population infected (note different scale used 
for panel A). All epidemics are based on a 
population with 50 % A / 50 % O individuals 
and initialised at t = 0 with type O index cases 
and 1/1,000,000 of the population infected. 
Rmax = 2 and ρ = 30 % for all epidemics 
modelled. A: No vaccination. B: 35.4 % of the 
population vaccinated at t = 0, all type A. C: 
35.4 % of the population vaccinated at t = 0, all 
type O. D: 35.4 % of the population vaccinated 
at t = 0, half type A and half type O. Vacci-
nating O is slightly more effective than vacci-
nating A, but vaccinating both types leads to 
herd immunity at a lower threshold.   
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individuals, ABO antigen is expressed exclusively in red blood cells and 
the vascular endothelium and is not present in other cell types. 
Conversely, in “secretor” individuals with at least one functional FUT2 
allele, ABO antigens will be present on many different types of epithelial 
cells including the lining of the respiratory and digestive tracts. In the 
context of the ABO-interference model described here, non-secretor in-
dividuals will still form anti-A and anti-B antibodies, and thus exhibit 
disease susceptibility according to their ABO blood type. However, they 
are unlikely to deposit A or B determinants on virions produced in lung 
cells, and so will transmit the virus freely, as if they were type O. Since 
around 20 % of individuals in Western countries are non-secretors 
(Nordgren et al., 2016), and the estimated value of ρ is ~40 % (see 
above), then non-secretor individuals likely account for around half the 
observed cross-type transmission. 
Factors (b) and (c) are related and I shall consider them together. 
While titres vary, virtually all individuals carry at least some antibodies 
to non-self ABO glycans. These are generally acquired in the first few 
years of life following exposure to microbial surface glycans similar to A 
or B determinants (Cooling, 2015). Anti-A and anti-B antibodies are 
typically IgM and IgA subtypes, however IgG can also be seen in patients 
following heterologous transfusion and systemic exposure to antigen. 
This has implications for factor (c) in that secretory IgA is the predom-
inant antibody type found in mucosal secretions, along with smaller 
amounts of secreted IgM (Cerutti et al., 2011). While the level of 
anti-ABO antibody in respiratory secretions has not been well studied, it 
is plausible that some amounts of both IgA and IgM may be present. 
These will not however be able to trigger complement-mediated inac-
tivation of virus particles as the full complement cascade requires serum 
and is not present in the case of mucosal immunity. Anti-A/B antibodies 
may however block virus entry directly if the AB determinants are borne 
on the virus spike glycoprotein, as previously shown (Guillon et al., 
2008; Preece et al., 2002; Deleers et al., 2020). Alternatively, IgA and 
IgM may agglutinate virus particles and trap them in the mucus barrier 
layer. 
3.2. Implications of the estimated level of ABO-interference for public 
health strategy 
If ABO-interference is the cause of the widely observed bias in SARS- 
CoV-2 infection rates among different blood types, then this model al-
lows us to conclude that ABO incompatibility reduces SARS-CoV-2 
transmission by at least 60 % and potentially more. This implies that 
the apparent R0 for most of the largest epidemics around the world has 
already been suppressed by at least ~25 %, and that Rmax is likely to be 
substantially higher than the actually-measured Rsteady. However, it is 
key to appreciate that no blood type is necessarily high- or low-risk: 
rather the nature of any protection is entirely context dependent. The 
presence of a diverse mix of blood types within any given community (i. 
e. within the pool of individuals that freely mix and may transmit the 
virus to each other) confers significant protection. Conversely, com-
munities with limited blood type diversity have little or no inherent 
protection and will suffer disproportionately from SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tion. Herd immunisation threshold estimates derived from current data 
may therefore substantially underestimate the level of vaccination 
required to protect vulnerable communities such as Native populations 
in both North and South America. In these, the type O frequency ap-
proaches 100 % (Ottensooser and Pasqualin, 1949), thus the true in-
fectious potential of SARS-CoV-2 will be unmasked and the local R0 will 
tend towards Rmax. 
This heterogeneity in transmissibility means that in general, the risk 
to non-O and in particular type AB individuals in most countries will be 
higher than risk to type O individuals, while type O individuals are more 
infectious than non-O individuals. This may contribute to the marked 
overdispersion in transmission frequency for SARS-CoV-2 (Endo et al., 
2020), and help explain why a small subset of patients are responsible 
for the majority of transmission events. If other polymorphic surface 
glycans (e.g. Lewis and P antigens) behave similarly, this will further 
magnify the differences between “super-spreaders” and 
“super-recipients”. 
Paradoxically, however, although in this model both disease 
vulnerability and infectiousness vary substantially between different 
blood types, it is important not to simplistically target vaccination on 
this basis. Rather, once a vaccine is available, care should be taken not to 
inadvertently destroy the existing blood type frequency structure that 
provides population-wise disease resistance, by ensuring good vaccine 
uptake among all communities. There is a danger that the growing 
public perception that “type O = low risk” will lead type O individuals to 
neglect or even refuse vaccination. If this tendency is not monitored and 
compensated for, it may disproportionately reduce the efficacy of public 
vaccination programs. Other types of blood-type-aware non-pharma-
ceutical interventions are not modelled here. If protective equipment is 
in limited supply, it may for example be appropriate for hospitals and 
care facilities to emphasise source control measures for type O “super- 
spreaders”, and recipient protection measures for type A and AB “super- 
recipients”. More sophisticated agent-based approaches will be needed 
to model this possibility (Ferguson et al., 2020) 
3.3. Implications of this model for evolution of the ABO polymorphism 
Irrespective of the detailed epidemiology of any disease, at the in-
dividual level type O alleles are always selectively favoured under this 
model, while type A and B alleles are subject to frequency-dependent 
selection. This predicts that - as seen across the globe - type O will 
have the highest allele frequency, while A and B alleles will be at lower 
frequency and more nearly similar to each other. Extending the SIR 
model to cover the case of waning immunity shows that the elevated risk 
to non-O blood types remains present even for endemic rather than 
epidemic disease, and thus long-term population morbidity and mor-
tality from diseases subject to ABO-interference may be one factor 
affecting ABO allele population frequency, as previously modelled by 
Seymour et al. (Seymour et al., 2004). 
Evolutionarily, this model provides an interesting case where indi-
vidual and group advantages differ, since while O is always individually 
favoured, population-level disease resistance is optimised at relatively 
low type O frequencies. This tension between individual and group 
optima leads to a “tragedy of the commons” in which selection drives O 
Fig. 5. These panels show the evolution of various modelled parameters for epidemics involving waning immunity. Waning immunity is described by a parameter ω 
representing the rate of loss of immunity (see Methods for details). For all epidemics ρ = 20 %, and the model is initialized with type O index cases comprising 1/ 
1,000,000 of the population. Since type O transmits freely to all recipients, R(t) = Rmax at time t = 0. 
A: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, ω = 1/90 days− 1, “Western” population blood type distribution, 38 % A / 14 % B / 4 % AB / 44 % O. 
B: Rmax = 2, ρ = 20 %, ω = 1/90 days− 1, “Western” population blood type distribution as above. 
C: Rmax = 40, ρ = 20 %, ω = 1/90 days− 1, “Western” population blood type distribution as above. D: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, ω = 1/90 days− 1, “Indian” population blood 
type distribution, 21.4 % A / 39.9 % B / 9.4 % AB / 29.3 % O (Chandra and Gupta, 2012). 
E: Rmax = 4, ρ = 20 %, ω = 1/90 days− 1, “Peruvian” population blood type distribution, 18.9 % A / 8.1 % B / 1.6 % AB / 71.4 % O (Anon., 2021b). 
For all sub-panels, X axis denotes days. Y axes: (first column) proportion of the population infected; (second column) R(t) as a fraction of Rmax; (third column) 
distribution of blood types among currently infected individuals; (fourth column) cumulative risk of infection for each blood type relative to type O. The relative risks 
to different blood types during the final steady state depend on Rmax (compare A,B,C) and on the background blood type distribution (compare A,D,E). The final case 
burden depends on all of Rmax, ω, ρ and the background blood type distribution. 
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alleles to a higher frequency than the group optimum and leaves the 
resulting population more vulnerable to disease. Seymour et al. show 
that there must necessarily also be some countervailing selection pres-
sure to prevent fixation of type O – they attribute this to a concomitant 
“arms race” with bacterial pathogens that use ABO antigens as adhesins 
and thus provide a constant balancing selection in favour of rare blood 
groups (Seymour et al., 2004). The net result is thus a contest between 
the bacterial interactions (which generally favour equal frequencies of 
all blood groups) and virus interactions (which always favour type O). 
However, under this model it is not clear why type A and type B are 
not globally more equal in frequency. A recent preprint (Souilmi et al., 
2021) may shed light on this debate, providing genetic evidence for past 
coronavirus-driven selective sweeps occurring specifically within East 
Asian populations. As well as indicating that coronavirus emergence in 
this region has been a recurrent threat over thousands of years, this 
regionally-contained selective pressure provides a plausible basis for the 
more balanced A:B frequencies found in these regions. More generally, it 
is likely that ABO frequency in the population will be locally determined 
by their interactions with the pathogens most prevalent in each region 
over evolutionary time scales. 
3.4. ABO-interference and seasonal coronaviruses with waning immunity 
For seasonal endemic coronaviruses, if these are subject to ABO- 
interference, this model predicts that that (in Western populations) 
type A and AB individuals should be more susceptible to infection, and 
type O less susceptible, but to a less pronounced degree than for SARS- 
CoV-2. It will therefore be interesting to determine whether non-O blood 
types are indeed more likely to suffer more frequent repeat endemic 
coronavirus infections. More speculatively, given the emerging evidence 
that COVID-19 is a multisystemic infection with particular impact on 
clotting pathways (Levi et al., 2020), could it be possible that the 
endemic coronaviruses may also have some effect on the likelihood of 
thrombosis? In addition to the known effect of ABO blood type on von 
Willebrand factor (vWF) levels (Franchini and Lippi, 2016), this could 
be an additional pro-thrombotic risk factor for non-O blood types. 
3.5. Key observations and new experiments needed to test this model 
In testing this model, the key experiment will be to directly deter-
mine whether A or B antigens are present on the virus envelope in in vivo 
infections, and whether A- or B-specific antisera can neutralise virus 
harvested from patients with the appropriate blood types. However, 
there are at least five other testable predictions from this model that may 
be addressable using existing epidemiological data:  
(i) in countries with high type B frequency such as India, type B 
individuals should be at higher risk than type A individuals. This 
prediction has already been substantiated by two studies pub-
lished during review of this modelling work (Rahim et al., 2020; 
Padhi et al., 2020)  
(ii) in studies of super-spreading events, the index cases should be 
disproportionately type O individuals and/or non-secretor 
individuals.  
(iii) Direct contact-tracing data should in general follow the blood 
transfusion rules. For in-family tracing, transmission between 
blood relatives - being more likely to share a blood type - may be 
more common than transmission between spouses, though this 
will be substantially confounded by age and behavioural effects.  
(iv) In hotspot areas, once the overall case frequency exceeds 
approximately 20 %, the relative risks will begin to decline, as the 
epidemic proceeds through the type O population in a delayed 
manner. Longitudinal studies will be needed to address this, 
however this factor may explain the lack of any blood type cor-
relation with susceptibility in high prevalence scenarios such as 
the Charles de Gaulle study (Boudin et al., 2020).  
(v) In communities with high type O frequency, Rsteady will be higher, 
the doubling time shorter and the relative risk to non-O blood 
types reduced when compared to otherwise similar communities 
with lower type O frequency. Similarly, communities with a 
highly skewed A:B ratio will have a higher Rsteady and a shorter 
doubling time than communities with more nearly equal numbers 
of A and B individuals. This latter prediction has already been 
supported by two recent preprints (Liu et al., 2020; Miotto et al., 
2020) 
4. Materials and methods 
4.1. An SIR model of ABO-interference with virus transmission 
A standard SIR model of infection divides the population into three 
compartments, Susceptible, Infectious, Recovered, representing the 
proportion of individuals in the population with each status, and thus 




= − β⋅S⋅I + ω⋅R  
dI
dt
= β⋅S⋅I − ν⋅I  
dR
dt
= ν ⋅I − ω⋅R 
The parameters β and ν represent the rate constants for infection and 
recovery, and their reciprocals 1 / β and 1 / ν represent the average time 
required for one infectious individual to transmit to one susceptible 
individual, and the average duration of the infectious period. The ratio β 
/ ν represents the basic reproductive number R0. The parameter ω 
represents the rate constant for loss of immunity, and thus transfer from 
the R compartment back to S. Its reciprocal 1 / ω represents the average 
duration of immunity following recovery. In the analyses presented 
here, I extend this model by splitting each of S, I and R into four sub-
compartments representing the four ABO blood types. These are then 
linked by a set of twelve equations: 
dSA
dt
= − β⋅SA⋅(IA + ρIB + ρIAB + IO) + ω⋅RA  
dSB
dt
= − β⋅SB⋅(ρIA + IB + ρIAB + IO) + ω⋅RB  
dSAB
dt
= − β⋅SAB⋅(IA + IB + IAB + IO) + ω⋅RAB  
dSO
dt
= − β⋅SO⋅(ρIA + ρIB + ρIAB + IO) + ω⋅RO  
dIA
dt
= β⋅SA⋅(IA + ρIB + ρIAB + IO) − ν⋅IA  
dIB
dt
= β⋅SB⋅(ρIA + IB + ρIAB + IO) − ν⋅IB  
dIAB
dt
= β⋅SAB⋅(IA + IB + IAB + IO) − ν⋅IAB  
dIO
dt
= β⋅SO⋅(ρIA + ρIB + ρIAB + IO) − ν⋅IO  
dRA
dt
= ν⋅IA − ω⋅RA  
dRB
dt
= ν⋅IB − ω⋅RB 
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= ν⋅IAB − ω⋅RAB  
dRO
dt
= ν⋅IO − ω⋅RO  
These equations were implemented as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
(Supplementary Data File 1). In this model R0 is not a well-defined 
quantity since even in a fully susceptible population the current effec-
tive R value, denoted R(t), depends on ρ and on the blood type distri-
butions in both S and I. In this paper, I use Rmax to indicate the ratio β / ν, 
i.e. the R0 that would be observed in the absence of any ABO- 
interference. This is the maximal possible value of R(t), and would be 
observed if ρ  = 100 %, or if all currently infected individuals are type O. 
For the work presented here, all epidemics were initiated by transferring 
1/1,000,000 of the population from S to I at time t = 0. This for example 
represents an initial importation of ~9 infected index cases into a city 
the size of London. Varying these boundary conditions from 1/10,000 to 
1/100,000,000 has no effect other than accelerating or retarding the 
initial progress of the epidemic (not shown). All index cases were 
assumed to be of blood type O. For all analyses except that presented in 
Fig. 5, immunity was assumed to be permanent and thus ω = 0. 
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